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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIElD (D., MONTANA) 
DEFENSE AND MR . McNAMARA 
Mr. President: 
H 
h~l 0 i J 1963 
For some time the Government Operations Committee has been 
in~uiring into the circumstances surrounding the award of a contract for 
development of the T.F.X. plane . What will emerge from this investigation, 
what legislation will derive from it , cannot be foreseen. It is not my 
intention to anticipate, much less to prejudge the Committee's findings. 
But whatever the outcome, let there be no doubt as to the interest of 
the Senate in this matter . It is an entirely appropriate and pertinent 
interest . 
Public funds are spent in vast sums for military research and 
development. Together with the President, it is the Congress which pro-
vides the legal basis for the procedures under which these funds are 
expended . It is the Congress which appropriates these funds . It is the 
Congress which must answer to the people as to the general wisdom of the 
appropriations . And in part at least, the Congress must answer for the 
effectiveness with which these appropriations are disbursed by the Execu-
tive Branch. The very process of Committee inquiry, moreover, has signi-
ficant value in an educative sense . And in the end that which may be 
learned in this or any particular case could well have wider legislative 
application. In in~uiring deeply into the T.F.X. matter, therefore, the 
Committee on Government Operations is discharging a wholly legitimate 
function by authority of and on behalf of the Senate. 
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May I say that what has transpired to date in the investigation 
has led me to take the floor today. I do so to give voice to the views of 
one Member of the Senate, a Senator from Montana. The views are not new. 
Rather, they are views which have accumulated over the years and have begun 
to crystalize in the light of developments in the T.F.X. inquiry. 
It is apparent from these hearings, that an immense number of 
factors were involved in the T.F.X. contract award. Some of these factors 
are of a military nature. Others are broader than military in their impli-
cations. And many are not open or shut tangibles but, rather, involve best 
judgments on the part of the men who are expected by the nature of the 
responsibilities entrusted to them to make best judgments. 
Since such is the case, I do not believe that it is reasonable 
to expect any Senator or Committee of Senators to say with certainty that 
Secretary McNamara's decision in the T.F .X. was the right one or the wrong 
one. Nor do I believe that the spokesman of any particular branch of the 
Armed Services is competent to say with certainty that the Secretary's 
decision was the right one or the wrong one . Nor, in the light of the 
factors involved, are all of the spokesmen of the military services combined 
competent to do so . To be sure, their professionalism gives great weight 
to such objective military opinions as they may advance. But we should not 
overlook the fact that their very professionalism compels them to regard 
the development of a piece of military equipment, not in the context of 
total costs and national policies but largely in terms of military desira-
bility and specific utility and, perhaps, even more pointedly, in terms of 
military desirability and specific utility as seen against a background of 
a particular training and service experience. That is as it should be. 
Military leaders are not required and ought not to be required to answer 
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the questions of the people of this nation as to the additional tax burdens 
or the neglected civilian needs which any military cost may entail. But 
these questions must be answered by someone in this government. Indeed, 
they must be answered by the President and by the Congress. And because 
that is the case and must remain so under a system of free and responsible 
government, it is not appropriate and it may be misleading to weigh military 
observations on any weapons-system in a vacuum and to assume that decisions 
arrived at on that basis are automatically the valid decisions. 
Even Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, with all due respect, 
cannot speak with certainty as to the correctness of his decisions in the 
T.F.X. matter. Only time, if even that, will permit a logical assessment 
of his specific judgments. 
The truth is that there are no certainties in matters of this 
kind. 
T.F.X. apart, I am inclined to think--and I reason now from 
history rather than specifics--that at some future date it will be seen 
in retrospect that Mr. McNamara made many correct decisions as Secretary 
of Defense and occasionally that he made wrong decisions. But for the 
present, all that can be asked, all that should be asked, of any man in 
his position is that, under the President, he exercise every diligence and 
full dedication to his public responsibility and do his best to reach the 
best decisions. 
On that score, Mr. McNamara needs no defense from me or anyone 
else. His record speaks for itself. His is, in these times, the most 
difficult and the most complex assignment in the government after the 
President. His immense international responsibilities which dovetail with 
those of the Secretary of State involve questions of life or death for tens 
of millions in this country and elsewhere. 
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In addition, he has the supreme administrative responsibilities 
for the Defense Establishment. That Department now contains a million 
civilian employes and more than two and a half million men and women in 
uniform. 
Reposed in him is the trust of dispensing public funds in excess 
of' $50 billion a year, a sum equal to more than the total of all other 
federal expenditures combined. 
In the light of these vast responsibilities, Secretary McNamara 
has been an outstanding and exceptional servant of the people of this 
nation . He was a tower of strength to the late President in carrying the 
great burdens of Chief Executive . His remaining in office at the request 
of President Johnson is an assurance to the nation that we will continue 
to have the highest possible degree of intelligent, experienced and dedicated 
public service in this most critical Cabinet position. 
Mr . McNamara was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Defense 
to see to it that this nation has the kind of defense structure which the 
President, together with the Congress, deem necessary for national security. 
He was confirmed by the Senate to bring about and maintain that structure 
at the lowest possible cost to the people of the United States. That--no 
more, no less-- is what the law, the Constitutional pm.,rers of the Presidency, 
and the dimensions of the office of Secretary of Defense require of him. 
And I should think that every Member of this body would want to consider a 
long time, a very long time, before seeking to require anything else of this 
Secretary of Defense or any other . I should think, too, that we would want 
to consider a long time, a very long time, before curbing or undermining 
the authority of the office of the Secretary of Defense in vievr of the 
critical decisions which must be made if this responsibility is to be 
effectively exercised. 
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If the Secretary of Defense does not have the authority to make 
the critical decisions where else shall it be lodged in this government? 
What shall we re~uire of the Secretary if it is not the critical decisions? 
That he serve as a kind of coach or water- boy or, perhaps, a chaplain for 
the military services? That the final decisions , not merely those of t he 
battlefield but of defense management and technology in effect , shall be 
made by military personnel? If I may be blunt, Mr . President , it would 
appear, in that concept , that the Secretary ' s principal functions woul d be 
reduced to fighting for the Defense Establishment's share of the total 
national budgetary pie and then to l~eeping the various services from com)_ng 
to blows over how it is to be divided . If I may be blunt, in prior years 
we have had our experience with that kind of an approach. 
Indeed, the Secretary of Defense is a sort of umpire . But the 
fact is that the present Secretary of Defense is an umpire who has sought 
increasingly to establish service- needs and expenditures on the basis of 
the re~uirements of total national policies and in response to the admoni-
tions of the Congr :ss for economic and efficient operation of the Defense 
Establishment . He is an umpire v7ho has exercised the authority of his 
office to say, not only "yes," but "no, " when necessary, and to make the 
"no" stick, He has exercised the power to say "no," increasingly, to curb 
that notorious invitation to waste and extravagence, the cost-plus contract . 
He has exercised the power to say "no" to budgetary re~uests from the various 
services which often and understandably are heavily influenced by a one-
service rather than an all- service concept of national defense . He has 
exercised the power to say "no" to separate service purchase of common use 
items of e~uipment and supply . And the Congress knows that this type of 
purchasing did much to bring about the stockpiling of military surpluses, 
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surpluses whose costs dwarf even those engendered in agriculture. He has 
exercised the power to say "no" to certain new weapons developments. However, 
any such development may intrigue its advocates, from the national point of 
view it ought not to be pursued unless it contains sufficient promise end 
can otherwise justify itself on the basis of cost-to-potential contribution 
to total defense. And lest there be any doubt of the need of such curbs, 
I shall read to the Senate a list of projects and their cost to the public--
projects which over the past ten years did indeed intrigue their advocates 
but which were abandoned before completion or declared obsolete or surplus 
soon efter completion. 
S .E E 
L I S T 
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The total cost of these abandoned projects in the past ten years 
is over $5 billion. To be sure, some value, some experience, may well have 
been obtained from each of them. But let there be no mistake about it. 
Taken together they are indicative, to say the least, of an immense and 
conspicuous consumption of the nation's supply of talent and facilities for 
research and development. For this technological high-living, it is the 
people of the United States vTho must pick up the check in actual military 
costs and in the incalculable costs of a distorted usage of scarce 
scientific and technological resources. 
Taken together these abandoned projects have represented, too, a 
major factor in running up the accumulation of surplus and obsolescent 
property by the armed services. For years in the past the total of such 
property disposed of at a fraction of cost has fluctuated between $4 billion 
and $8 billion annually. To put this figure . ·in some kind of perspective, 
consider that it means that every year our military establishment got rid 
of, at a fraction of cost, assets with a value anywhere from about equivalent 
to, to double the amount that the United Kingdom expends on~ its armed 
services for all purposes. In short, the British have been running their 
Army, Navy and Air Forces year in and year out for something less than the 
cost to us of our annual losses through excess military accumulations or 
obsolescence. 
Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense, has, indeed, said "no" 
with frequency during the three years in which he has been in office. Yet 
there is nothing to suggest that because he has done so our defense position 
in the world is any less effective, any less impressive than heretofore. 
On the contrary, such indications as there are suggest that the Defense 
Establishment is bett·er prepared and more capable of meeting a wider 
range of possible military challenges to this nation. 
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There is a good deal of talk about the high cost of government 
and the need to cut expenditures. In the light of this talk, I cannot 
imagine that anyone in the Senate would wish to undermine the Secretary's 
authority to say "no" to the ever-present and immense bureaucratic pressures 
for expenditures within ~he Defense Establishment. To be sure we can chop 
away at almost any item in the budget. The Department of State, for 
example, had a budget request for $374 million this year and a show of 
economy can be made by reducing it and closing a fevl consulates abroad in 
the process. But we are deluding ourselves if we believe for one moment 
that it will be possible to curb the growth in the cost of the federal 
government, let alone reduce that cost significantly unless someone has 
the authority, under the President, to act decisively in connection with 
defense expenditures. For that is where the great expenditures are. In 
the 1964 budget, for example, $53.7 billion was proposed by the President 
for the Defense Establishment. The next allocation in size in that budget 
was $11.3 billion for Treasury, and of this total $10.2 billion represents 
an allocation for interest on the public debt. 
I ask the Senate to note, further, that the figure of $53.7 
billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department represented 
the final figure proposed in the budget submitted to Congress early this 
year. But before it was arrived at, Secretary McNamara had pared down 
reguests from all of the individual military services under his supervision. 
When these individual requests initially reached his desk they totaled the 
great sum of $67 billion. In other ·1-1ords, Mr. President, the services, 
left to their ovm individual devices, would have sought of the Congress 
$13.3 billion more than the Secretary of Defense, in the end, allowed them 
to ask. And yet in spite of this enormous cut, the $53 .7 bj.llion requested 
for the armed services for fiscal year 1964 was still a record high. 
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Uith all due respect, would the President have been in a position 
to direct, except arbitrarily, a cut of $13.3 billion in the combined re-
quests of the various services7 With all due respect, would this body or 
even its exceptionally capable Armed Services Committee have been able to 
say "no", with any degree of confidence, to the tune of a reduction of 
$13-3 billion7 Hould the equivalent body in the House7 With all due 
respect, I t hink the Congress would have had great difficulty in knowing 
where to enter the jungle of Defense finance and I doubt that we would have 
gone much beyond the fringes for fear of jeopardizing the necessary defense 
of the nation. 
And, so, Mr. President, we are back to a Secretary of Defense 
with authority. If we did not have one he would have to be invented. 
I am persuaded that we have in office an exceptional Secretary 
of Defense who is attempting to meet the full responsibilities of that 
office. I believe that he is exercising with great determination, intel-
ligence and knowledge the authority which must go with those responsibili-
ties. 
It would seem to me that we ought to do whatever we are able to 
do to help him in his responsibilities. For we are all in agreement that 
we are seriously challenged by Communist power from abroad in a military 
sense as well as in other ways. We are all in agreement that against the 
military challenge there must be posed the necessary military defense for 
the security of the nation, at whatever the cost. 
But the extent of the challenge from abroad is a variable depend-
ing upon changes in the world situation. The phrase "necessary military 
defense 11 is a variable, subject in interpretation to infinite extension. 
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And the phrase "at vhatever the cost" is a blank cheque which if taken in 
a literal sense, can be drawn, in the end, upon the total resources of the 
people of the United States. 
These are realities, Mr. President, whLch are just beginning to 
dawn upon us. These are realities with which, I believe, the present 
Secretary of Defense is seeking to grapple. These are realities to which, 
as legislators, we must turn our attention. It seems to me that we must 
begin to think deeply as to how the dimensions of "necessary military de-
fense" may be drawn and redrawn more accurately in the light of an ever-
changing international situation. And we must ask ourselves, too, how 
are we to keep "whatever the cost" of that necessary defense at a rational 
level in order that, in the end, it does not overwhelm the nation. 
These are not empty questions nor are they theoretical questions. 
"Necessary defense" has been defined and redefined consistently over the 
past decade as more and more. trHhatever the cost" has risen from $37.8 
billion in fiscal 1954 to the $53·7 billion which was requested for fiscal 
1964. And the latter figure, as already noted, was presented to the Con-
gress after the Secretary of Defense had reduced ~·;;; the initial service 
requests of $67 billion by $13·3 billion. 
May I say that it is understandable if, in defining the dimen-
sions of necessary military defense, those who have direct military respon-
sibility are inclined to leave a margin for safety. That is appropriate; 
it is proper; it is to be commended rather than criticized. After all, 
those who have these responsibilities are grappling in an area which is 
both inexact and ever-changing and one which is not subject, in the end, 
to computer-calculation. 
I, for one, do not begrudge the cost of a margin for extra 
safety--a substantial margin--and I believe the people of the nation 
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are similarly inclined. But the problem still remains . We must be ever-
mindful lest in determining what is necessary for military defense we be-
come so obsessed with the extra margin for safety that it grows into a 
fear-fed monster which, in the end, devours that ''hich it is designed to 
safeguard. 
In the same fashion, our willingness to pay "whatever the cost" 
of necessary defense must not be an invitation to acquiesce in administra-
tive procedures within the defense establishment which tend toward waste-
ful rather than prudent expenditures. And I would emphasize that in this 
area--in the area of management procedures--there is no excuse for an ex-
cessive margin of safety. Expenditures for the management of the defense 
establishment, unlike the determination of over- all defense needs, can be 
subject to reasonably exact control by computer-calculation, by accounting 
procedures and by the many other tools of modern American business manage-
ment. 
If I may sum up, Mr . President, two questions ought to be ever-
present in our minds in considering any problem of defense : 
1 . How are vTe to insure that this government defines and re-
defines "necessary military defense" with full adequacy but without fan-
tastic and obsessive excess, in a world situation in which "necessary 
defense" is an ever-changing but not necessarily an ever-increasing 
quantity? 
2 . How are we to design the procedures within this government 
and within the Defense establishment so that they will provide this fully 
adequate necessary defense at the least cost to the people of the nation 
who, in the end, must pay for it? 
Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 42 , Folder 16, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
- 12 -
There is no formula by which these questions may be ansvered. 
For years, we have been ordering and re-ordering the processes of the 
Executive Branch, in order that that branch may define mo~e accurately 
for the President the nature of tlle international dangers 'llhich conf'ront 
us. For years we have been orde~ing and re-ordering the structure of t he 
Defense Department, in an effort to limit expendi~~es to the necessary. 
Yet year after year the problem has loomed largere 
If there is not an easy formula~ there are certain negatives 
which might be examined for the light that they shed on what may stimulate 
defense costs far beyond the necessary. These are the things, it seems to 
me, we must not do, if we mean to keep a rational perspective on the 
realities which face us in the world and, in the light of them3 hold ex-
penditures for defense at a rational level consistent with national security. 
These negatives, these tentative observations1 I should like to leave with 
the Senate in concluding my remarks. 
In defining and redefining the dimensions of "what is necessary" 
for defense, we are likely to leave a most vrasteful, rather. than a desir-
able margin for safety unless these realities are recognized anevr: 
1. That, under our system of government1 there can be no 
substitute for the preRonderant judgments of the President as to the total 
and the ever-changing challenge from abroad to this nation. These judg-
ments must provide the key for determining the essential dimensions of 
vrhat is militarily necessary for the security of the nation. 
2~ That, in making his judgments, the President must neces-
sarily depend on advice and counsel from whatever sources he deems appro-
priate--military and civilian--but once his judgments are made, it is in-
appropriate for any permanent official of the Executive Branch--military 
or civilian--to do other than his best to carry them into effect. 
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3· That the President's judgments--once made--in this 
connection are subject to challenge not by permanent officials of the 
Executive Branch--military or civiH.an--but only by the Congress, acting 
as the Constitution makes clear that it can and shall act, by legislative 
initiative and by legislative oversight. 
4. That, under the President and the laws of the land, the 
Secretary of Defense has the authority to establish--with the help of the 
Joint Chiefs--the strategic concepts which shall set for all the armed 
services, their appropriate roles in maintaining the kind of defense which 
the President and the Congress have deemed necessary for the nation's 
security; and, further, that within the Defense Establishment, the Secretary 
of Defense has authority to control administrative procedures and practices 
for efficient and effective operations. 
And if I may continue with the negatives, Mro President, I should 
like also to stress that we are not going to get an effective and efficient 
defense at a tolerable cost unless it is recognized in all frankness: 
lo That the Defense Establishment, as the largest single 
purchaser of goods and services in the nation, has come to occupy a substan-
tial position in the civilian economy of this nation; that, in this connec-
tion1 what the Defense Department does or does not do has come to have great 
importance not only for defense but for the well-being of business, labor 
and whole communities scattered throughout the nationo 
2. That, in the light of this economic position which the 
Defense Establishment occupies it would be a gross naivete to assume that 
pressures--increasing pressures--will not be present for decisions to be 
made by the Defense Department not solely on considerations of necessary, 
effective and efficient defense--and may I say that collo~uies on the floor 
between Senators from various of the larger states underscore this point. 
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3. That however understandable these pressu·es may be--and 
as a Senator from Montana I hope that I try to do as much for ~Y stat2 ~~ 
any other Member--the nation will be ill-served if there is not lTithin this 
government those attitudes and those conditions for administration of the 
affairs of the Defense Establishment which pe~mit the decisions, i n the 
end, to be made on the basis of necessary, effective an~ eff icient defense. 
Mr. President, in making these remarks today, I have not been 
unaware of the eloquent farewell address of the former President, Mr. 
Eisenhower, in which he warned of the need to guard against the development 
of an industrial-military complex of power in the nation. Nor have I been 
unmindful of dangers to that classic doctrine of freedom--the doctrine of 
civilian supremacy. 
And yet, with all due respect, I do not see the principal diff1= 
culty which confronts us in these contexts. If there were ever to be an 
imminent danger to freedom in this nation of the kind alluded to by Mr. 
Eisenhower, it is not likely to be the cause of the failure of popularly 
responsible government. Rather it is likely to be the consequence of the 
failure of civilian responsibility in the Congress no less than in the 
Executive Branch of the government. And I want to say to the Senate, that 
this system of freedom which we know will not fail. It will not fail so 
long as an excessive fear does not drive us to an obsessive interpretation 
of what is necessary for defense. It will not fail if we are prepared to 
face the economic and social difficulties which confront the nation and 
deal with them on their own merits--their civilian merits--rather than to 
seek to evade them, or to act on them haphazardly and inadequately and 
ineffectively because we find it easier to act under the camouflage of an 
inflated concept of military necessity . 
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These, then, Mr. President, are some of the observations which 
I have to make. They are observations stimulated by the work of the 
T.F.X. inquiry which is being conducted by the very able Senator from 
Arkansas (Mr. McClellan) and his distinguished colleagues on the Government 
Operations Committee. They are observations growing out of a very high 
respect for the patriotic dedication and the ability with which Mr. McNamara 
is seeking to serve the nation under the President. 
It is incumbent upon all of us, it seems to me, not to ignore 
these larger implications of the T.F.X. matter. It is incumbent upon us--
the President, the Congress, the press and the people of the United States--
to face them, to discuss them, and, as necesaary, to act on them within the 
Constitution. 
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Project Title 
MISS1IES 
DART 
Department of the Army 
Projects Cancelled 
(1953 - 1963) 
Funds Invested Prjme 
Year Cancelled (Millions of Dollars) Contractor .; (s) 
1958 44.0 Aerophysics Corp. 
A wire-guided surface-to-surface antitank missile with a range 
of approximately 6,000 yards. This missile system was cancelled 
since the French designed SS-10 proved to be more effective in this 
role. 
ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHIClES .AND RElATED EQUIFMENT 
VIGILANTE Sperry Gyroscope 
A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti-aircraft gun system mounted on a 
full-track vehicle chassis and complete with radar fire control. 
This gun system was cancelled since the MAULER surface-to-air 
missile system has been designed and should be more effective in 
the anti-aircraft role intended. 
OTHER EQUIPMENT 
AN/USD 4 Drone 1960 Republic Aviation 
A medium endurance survelliance drone, capable of carrying a 
450 lb o pay-load for 55 minutes duration. This drone program 
was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD-5, when 
developed, could perform this mission as well. 
AN/USD 5 Drone 103-3 Fairchild Astro 
Corporation 
A long-endurance surve:iJ.J.ance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb. 
pay-load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled 
since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force 
with their F4c and RF-101 modernization program can perform the 
mission more effectively. 
Mike Mansfield Papers: Series 21, Box 42 , Folder 16, Mansfield Library, University of Montana.
Project Title 
AIRCRAFT: 
SEAMASTER 
Department of the Navy 
Projects Cancelled 
(1953 - 1963) 
Funds Invested 
Year Cancelled (Millions of Dollars) 
1959 
Prime 
Contractor(s) 
Martin Co~ 
Marlen Const o Co. 
Jet powered mine laying seaplaneo Specialized for low 
altitude attack against submarine pens., Cancelled because of 
technical problems, high cost and slippage in programo 
MISSilES: 
REGULUS II 1958 144.4 Ling Tempco 
L.F. Stillwell 
& Co. 
Surface-to-surface missile with 500 nautical mile range 
and weight of ll,570 lb. eq_uipped wit-h Shoran grid guidance. 
Cancelled because it became redundant vrhen better systems vrere 
aEsured before its completion. 
PETREL 1957 Fairchild A/C 
Air-to-surface missile with 20 nautical mile range and 
weight of 3300 lbs. equipped with active radar homing plus 
acoustic torpedoo Cancelled for consideration of reasons 
including state-of-the-art advances, changing military re-
quirements and cost considerations. 
CORVUS 1960 Ling Tempco 
Air-to-surface missile with 170 nautical mile range and 
weight of 1750 lbs. equipped with passive or semi-act:i.ve radar 
homing. Cancelled for consideration of reasons including state-
of-the-art advances, changing military requirements, cost con-
siderations, plus contractor difficulties. 
EAGlE 1961 Bendix Aviation 
Air-to-air missile with 70 nautical mile range and weight 
of 1400 lbs. equipped with midcourse command plus active radar 
homing. Since this was the missile system for the Missileer 
aircraft, it was cancelled ,,.,hen Missileer was dropped. 
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Project Title 
MISSilES: 
METEOR 
Department of the Navy 
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Year Cancelled 
Funds Invested 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Prime 
Contractor(s) 
M. I. T. 
Air-to-air missile with 10 nautical mile range and weight 
of 510 lbs. and semi-active homing. Cancelled in weeding out 
of early air-to-air missile projects in favor of more promising 
air-to-air projects. 
RIGEL 1953 Grumman A/C 
Surface-to-surface missile with 4oo nautical mile range 
and weight of 19,000 lbs. equipped with ramjet, command mid-
course, plus radar homing. Cancelled for same weeding out 
process as METEOR above, plus it was a competitor to REGULUS. 
DOVE 1955 33·7 Eastman Kodak 
Co~ 
Air-to-surface missile with gravity bomb and weight of 1300 lbs. 
equipped with infrared homing. Cancelled because of changing re-
quirements plus technical difficulties. 
SHIPS: 
Submarine Underwater 
Propulsion Systems 1954 General Electric 
Allis-Chalmers 
Elliott Company 
Westinghouse 
Elec. 
Work began in 1945 and continued to 1954 on closed and semi-
closed propulsion cycles, all of which could be used to propel 
submarines in fully submerged conditions. Cancelled because of 
the success of nuclear propulsion. 
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OTHER: 
Department of the Navy 
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Funds Invested 
Year Cancelled (Millions of Dollars) 
Prime 
Contractor( s) 
NRRS, Sugar Grove 1962 70.0 Tidewater Constr~ Co. 
Patterson-Emerson 
Constr. 
A 6oo'dia.meter, rotatable radio antennae device to 
provide an improved capability in spece research and in-
telligence gathering activities. Cancelled because costs 
increased from initial estimate of less than $8o million 
to over $190 million and, during the period when the struc-
tural design phase of the antennae was in progress, other 
scientific techniques capable of performing the antennae 
functions were perfected. 
ZIP Fuel 1959 Callery Chem. Coo 
Fuel of 50% higher energy than jet fuel, for use in 
gas turbines. Cancelled because of high cost and technical 
difficulties. 
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Funds Invested 
Year Cancelled (Millions of Dollars) 
Prime 
Contractor( s) 
AIRCRAFT: 
A11P 511.6** Boeing/Gen. Dyna. 
GE/PP.:.W 
This was a program to develop a nuclear-powered long-range, 
long endurance aircraft for possible strategic application. The 
program was cancelled because it had inadequate military potential 
in any form which was technically feasible. 
F-108 1959 North American 
This program was for development of a long-range ( 1000 mile) 
supersonic manned interceptor, equipped with a highly sophisticated 
fire control system, to counter the airborne bomber threat of the 
1960's and 1970's. The overall program was cancelled because of 
the relative decrease of the manned bomber threat. 
XF-103 1957 10~.0 Republic 
This was an advanced fighter concept for a titanium mach 
3.0 fighter, powered by a dual cycle (turbojet/ramjet) propulsion 
system. It 'Was cancelled primarily as a result of technical 
problems (e.g. poor visibility, J -67 engine problems) rising costs, 
and greater promise of the F-108 program (e.g. long range). 
F-107 1957 100.0 North American 
This was a fighter-bomber development program in competition 
with the F-105. It was cancelled in favor of the latter, which 
proved to be a superior weapon system. 
J -83 Engines 1959 55o0 Fairchild 
This was a small lightweight turbojet engine in the 2000 lb. 
thrust range, for pos~ible missile or aircraft application. It 
was cancelled in favor of a competitively superior engine. 
* Tentative; pending termination proceedings. 
if* AF costs only. 
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Douglas 
This was a turboprop heavy long-range transport designed to 
carry 1001 000 lb. payload. It was cancelled because of potential 
high cost and because the C-133, although not capable of as hi&~ 
a payload, appeared sufficiently versatile to meet Air Force needs. 
T-61 Engine 1959 Allison 
This was an internal combustion burboprop engine of advanced 
designc Cancellation was based on the fact that the engine had not 
been designated for application to any specific future weapon system. 
H-16 1954 Vertol 
This was an extremely large fuselage, twin-rotor, high capacity 
helicopter. Hampered by technical problems, delays and cost over-
run, it was cancelled as a result of reappraisal following the crash 
of an experimental model. 
MISSilES: 
NAVAHO 1957 North American 
This was a supersonic surface-to-surface intercontinental 
strategic missile. It was cancelled in its flight test phase, 
having been overtaken by t he accelerated ICBM development program. 
SNARK 677.4 Northrop 
This was a subsonic surface-to-surface intercontinental 
strategic missileo Although completely developed and placed in 
the active inventory, it was rendered quickly obsolete by the 
accelerated ICBM program. 
GAM-6 3 RASCAL 1958 448.0 Bell 
This was an air-launched air-to-surface missile for use by 
strategic forces (B-47)• The program was cancelled in favor of 
the inherently superior Hound Dog. 
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Douglas 
This was a ballistic missile to be air launched from the B-52 
or British Vulcan bombers. Cost escalation, time delay, revised 
estimates of actual performanace, and availability of other ways to 
do the job better on a cost-effectiveness basis caused cancellation. 
TALOS (Land Based) 1957 ll8.1 Bendix 
This was a land-based surface-to-air missile for the air defense 
missione Air Force effort terminated when short range surface-to-air 
missiles were designated as an Army sole responsibility. 
Mobile MINUTEMAN 108.4 Boeing 
This program consisted of the present Minuteman surface-to-
surface missile transported and fireo. from railroad cars o It was 
cancelled because of high cost and little military value versus 
other systems. 
Q-4 DRONE 1959 84.4 Norihrop 
This was a small turbojet drone to be used by Air Defense 
Command for training. It was cancelled because of a lack of 
funds and a change in requirements~ 
SM-73 GOOSE 1958 Fairchild 
This was a subsonic long range decoy missile for strategic 
application, to be ground launched as an electronic countermeasure 
device. The program was overtaken by other developments (eog. GAM-72 
Quail) and by changes in concept of operation. 
GAM.-67 CROSSBOW 1956 Northrop 
This program was the ori ginal air-to-surface anti-radiation 
missile (.ARM). The modern version is the SHRIKE. It was cancelled 
because other systems were considered more favorable and because of 
uncertainties in the guidance syste~. 
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1959 142.0 
Prime 
Cont.ra.ctor( s) 
Sperry 
This program was a complete integrated electronic counter-
measures system for the B-52. It was cancelled because of the 
extreme cost. 
Hi Energy Boron 
Fuel 1959 135·8** Olin Mathieson, 
others 
The program was for the development of fuel to power a 
Chemically Powered Bomber. It was cancelled because it was 
overtaken by other developments, because of technical problems 
encountered, and because the requirement was cancelled for the 
specific aircraft to which it had known application. 
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